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The world has witnessed a dramatic expansion of democracy since the 1970s. Huntington’s 
“Third wave” of democratic transition begun in Southern Europe and then spread to Latin 
America, Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, and continued through the 1990s in Africa. 
Along with this expansion of democracy and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, American, 
European, and multilateral governmental or non-governmental organizations have put in 
place fundamental democratization initiatives in the fields of diplomacy, foreign aid, and 
technical assistance, with the aim of supporting and strengthening those democratic 
transitions. Their work has focused mainly on sustaining political parties and civil society, 
training judges, conducting civic education campaigns, developing new constitutions and 
(above all) electoral laws, and observing elections. While it is still not clear if this growth 
of international democracy promotion can be considered an effect or a cause of the 
numerous democratic transitions, it can be claimed with a good probability of not being 
disowned by facts that such assistance efforts have reinforced and sustained the global 
trend toward more democracy. 
Despite the huge support for human rights, rule of law, mass media, and civil society 
programs, the bulk of the international democracy assistance has been devoted to 
elections. According to Bjornlund (2004), the reasons are straightforward. First, elections 
are a necessary, constitutive element of democracy (though not a sufficient one). Second, 
elections attract much attention of international agencies and donors. Third, the end of 
the Cold War, removing the justification for supporting authoritarian regimes, brought 
about an international consensus on the importance of democracy and elections. Fourth, 
elections marking the end of a civil war in which struggling democrats challenge 
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autocratic incumbents capture the international audiences, in particular as international 
aid is often conditional on holding of free and fair elections. Fifth, elections have been 
expected, rightly or wrongly, to play a major role in helping to resolve long-standing 
conflicts or in initiating or consolidating a democratic transition. While this last reason 
sounds a little naïf (there are a number of other actors, factors and processes involved), 
we should not forget that elections are an essential part of democracy, and must be 
treated as such. 
With this strong emphasis on elections, the industry of election observation (both 
international and domestic) has developed in scope, extent and influence. The importance 
given to elections has both resulted from and contributed to making election observation 
a common, accepted, international democracy promotion initiative. The amount of 
money devoted to this enterprise has increased enormously during the 1990s, and 
election observation has evolved from an ad hoc activity of experts, politicians and 
academics under the umbrella of American and European governmental and non-
governmental organizations, into an institutionalized practice, a sine qua non for 
conferring international legitimacy to democratizing regimes. 
Election observation is not perceived as essential in established democracies. It is not accepted 
in authoritarian regimes. But it has become the norm in democratizing countries and hybrid 
regimes. In such countries, election observation is considered a prerequisite for elections to be 
considered legitimate. It is increasingly difficult for countries in transition to explicitly refuse 
international observation. Governments that refuse observers tend to pay a significant price in 
terms of international legitimacy. Therefore, governments that lack a genuine commitment to 
full transparency have preferred to try to restrict who can observe or what observers can do, 
thus manipulating not only the election, but also the observation process.
Along with resources, demands on and the influence of election observation have also 
grown. Internal and external political actors, journalists, academics and common citizens 
rely on their assessments. However, very often too much is expected of the work of 
election observers. We should not forget that their task is limited to observing and 
reporting on the electoral process. International actors, domestic politicians and citizens 
in general, however, often expect international observers to deter (not only detect) fraud, 
to provide, with their mere presence, a fair political field, and, furthermore, to guarantee 
the integrity of the process. 
Obviously, observers do not have all this influence and power. Actually, they have no formal 
or legal role in the process and they must not be involved at all if we want them to be truly 
neutral. At most, they can have some positive spill-over effects, or unintended 
consequences, as deterring election-day fraud thanks to simply being there 
(Bjornlund, 2004, pp. 9–12). This chapter will be devoted to the analysis of an empirical 
case which will allow us to check the hypothesis, often advanced by practitioners, that 
international election observation missions are able to deter election-day fraud. 
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12.2 Observe and report, detect and 
deter
The question I would like to answer relates to the “effect of international election 
observation on election-day fraud”. This means trying to discover the influence of the 
simple presence of observers on the behaviour of candidates, electoral staff, and voters. 
Even if proponents of election observation promote this instrument claiming its potential 
to reduce fraud, that capability (that must first be proved) can be classed among the 
“unintended consequences” of international election observation, since the stated role of 
observers is simply to “observe and report” on an electoral process. Its potential is to 
reassure the electorate that it is safe for them to vote and run for office and/or to deter 
fraud. While this is a fundamental element of the role of observers, it is not technically 
part of the observers’ job. They are some of the “positive” spill-over effects or unintended 
consequences, something that the mere presence of observers can provoke under certain 
circumstances without explicitly meaning to. 
Is it true that electoral observation can bring cleaner elections, as proponents of this 
costly enterprise assert? The answer to this question is of fundamental importance to the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of election observation. We want to know if we are 
spending our limited resources (in time, money, staff, etc.) well, if our efforts are worth 
doing, if our actions have the expected consequences. Therefore, the question we should 
answer is: What is the effect of international election observation on election-day fraud?
Many scholars and practitioners assert that the mere presence of electoral observers 
works as a deterrent, helping to reduce election-day fraud. Is it empirically valid? Can this 
assertion be tested? 
What we are studying therefore is the observer effect on the behaviour of the actors 
involved in the electoral process, mainly on actors committing fraud on Election Day. 
While election irregularities (fraud, manipulation or violence) may take place before and 
after Election Day, and may be more effective in the pre- and post-election period, I am 
concentrating on election-day fraud1). Candidates or parties engage in various election 
1) Actually, there is an intrinsic difficulty in measuring the effect of observers on election irregularities taking place, for example, during the campaign 
period or the adjudication of election-related disputes.
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irregularities in order to win an election that would otherwise have an uncertain result2). 
It is not my intention to check if the presence of observers has an effect on all of them, 
because that would be difficult and misleading. Most irregularities occur well before 
election-day, such as intimidating candidates, hindering their participation in the election, 
putting undue pressure on mass media or manipulating voter lists. Other irregularities 
may take place after the election, during the resolution of election-related disputes or in 
the process of result aggregation. 
For empirical leverage, the design of this study is limited to irregularities that can occur on 
Election Day in and around polling stations. So what I want to concentrate on in this 
analysis are attempts to unduly influence the outcome of the election in and around 
polling stations. Election-day fraud ranges from voter intimidation to stuffing the ballot 
box, from denying particular voters or groups the right to vote to manipulating the 
counting of the votes, etc. All these forms of fraudulent behaviour have the same goal: 
increasing the share of votes for the party/candidate committing the fraud. 
It is exactly this kind of fraud that electoral observers are keen to detect and deter. The 
behaviour of internal political actors may be influenced by the physical presence of 
international election observers inside and around polling stations. What I’d like to test is 
whether the presence of observers reduces election-day fraud: If international election 
observation reduces election-day fraud, then the candidate or party sponsoring fraud 
should get a lower average share of the votes in the polling stations where observers were 
present than in polling station where they were not present. If the presence of international 
election observers has no effect on election-day fraud, then the performance of the 
candidate or party sponsoring fraud should be almost identical in observed and 
unobserved polling stations. Therefore, the measurable effect of the presence of observers 
on election-day fraud must be the lower share of the votes for the candidate or party 
sponsoring fraud. Actually, that candidate or party should perform worse on average in 
the observed polling stations. 
The scope of the scientific literature on international observation issues is quite narrow. 
They are case studies (among them, Anglin 1995 and 1998; Bjornlund, Bratton, and 
Gibson 1992, Laakso 2002), or research about election fraud (Alvarez, Hall, and Hyde 2008; 
Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shakin 2009; Lehoucq 2003; Schedler 2002, etc.), on how to 
define and operationalize the concept of “free and fair elections” (Elklit and Reynolds 2005; 
2) Andreas Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation”, Journal of Democracy, 13, 2, 2002, pp. 36–50. R. Michael Alvarez, Thad Hall, and Susan D. Hyde, Eds., 
Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008. M. Myagkov, P. C. Ordeshook, and D. 
Shakin, The Forensics of Election Fraud: Russia and Ukraine. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Fabrice Lehoucq, “Electoral Fraud: Causes, 
Types, and Consequences”, Annual Review of Political Science, 2003, pp. 233–256. Fabrice E. Lehoucq, Ivan Molina, Stuffing the Ballot Box, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
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Elklit and Svensson 1997; etc.) and international standards regarding elections and 
election observation (Goodwin-Gill 2006, European Commission and NEEDS 2007; etc.). To 
the best of my knowledge, the only attempt to assess the effectiveness of observation in 
deterring election-day fraud empirically is Susan Hyde’s work (2007 and 2010). Following 
her research, I will try to replicate her natural experiment (with some adjustments) on a 
new case to see if the results remain the same, i.e. in support of the observation enterprise. 
12.3 Polling station by polling station
The only strategy to assess the effectiveness of international observation missions in 
deterring election-day fraud is through a micro-level analysis. This is because any study 
comparing two or more countries would be stained by endogeneity problems. Therefore, 
in order to assess the causal effect of international observation missions we need to 
analyse a quasi-experiment in which observers are assigned to polling stations in a way 
that approximates randomization. This quasi or “natural” experiment3) allows us to check 
if international election observation has some effects on the behaviour of domestic 
political actors. By comparing election results of polling stations visited by observers with 
the results of those not visited, we can see if the presence of observers caused a reduction 
in election-day fraud. This way we can evaluate the “observer effect” at the sub-national 
level. In other words, if international election observation reduces election-day fraud 
directly, the party/candidate who is cheating gets fewer votes in polling stations visited 
by observers than in those not visited, all else being equal. 
The experimental nature of this research proposal lies in the random assignment of 
observers to polling stations. I will not discuss at length to what extent this research 
design can be considered experimental4), but I invite interested readers to see Hyde (2007, 
pp. 45–50). It suffices to point out that, although professional observer organizations such 
as the OSCE/ODIHR do not assign observers using random number tables or similar 
methods, the resulting distribution of observers to polling stations is highly unlikely to be 
3) In natural experiments, the researcher does not directly assign the treatment to randomly selected cases, but s/he observes cases where the independent 
variable is assigned “as if” it were random. Here, the burden of the proof rests on the researcher: s/he must demonstrate that the treatment can be 
regarded as randomly assigned. 
4) Actually, I checked, in the case studied here if the treatment can be considered near random. What is fundamental is that observer distribution does not 
follow a clear pattern that would predict voting distribution. Much of regional difference in observation coverage was due to voter density: there is, in 
fact, a relative balance in voters per observed polling station within each control group. For example, in round one, observers visited 1,834 “big” and 396 
“small” polling stations. As big polling stations have more voters, the more intensive observation coverage was due to voter density, and the voters per 
observed polling station ratio was quite similar across control groups in all three rounds. 
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systematically different from a pure randomization. In fact, the observation methodology 
guarantees that there is no geographical or other kind of bias, such as visiting “interesting” 
or “convenient” polling stations, in the distribution of observers to polling stations. And, 
more importantly, the choice of polling stations to visit is not driven by information about 
polling-stations attributes concerning voting patterns. 
Otherwise the assignment of the treatment could not be considered near random. Each 
short-term team is given an area of deployment to carry out its work. Inside this area, 
observers are free to visit the number of polling stations they deem appropriate. They can 
stay in a single polling station for as long as they deem necessary for a considered 
judgment, and they can return to any polling station if necessary. Moreover, it is standard 
practice for highly regarded international observation missions not to make public which 
polling stations they will observe on Election Day. This restricts the possibility of openly 
cheating in polling stations where international observers are not expected, and makes it 
difficult to anticipate their arrival.
12.4 Ukraine and its 2004 
presidential election
To which case will this analysis be applied? The choice of the case is an important part of 
the research. Unfortunately, due to the scarcity of data, not all elections observed by the 
European Union or the OSCE/ODIHR are suitable to the application of this design. They 
must have at least four characteristics: first, there must be a candidate or a party trying to 
cheat; second, there must be election results accessible at the polling station level; third, 
international observers must have been assigned in a way that approximates random 
assignment; and fourth, a list of polling stations visited by observers must be available5). 
The Ukrainian 2004 presidential election, which was observed by the OSCE/ODIHR, is an 
excellent case for testing the hypothesis. 
I took into account two further characteristics that made Ukrainian 2004 presidential 
elections a good case to analyse. First of all, it was a two-round election, which makes it 
5) I really thank the OSCE/ODIHR for giving me the possibility of running this analysis, even though it was not possible for them to give the list of observed 
polling stations directly to me. Actually, due to the sensitivity of the data, Professor Hans Schmeets, an OSCE/ODIHR statistician, built the dataset and 
run the statistical analysis on STATA following the design of this research. 
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possible to test also for “lasting” effects (see below). Moreover, the second round was 
repeated because the Supreme Court of Ukraine declared the second round invalid due to 
the widespread election irregularities during the runoff. This allowed a further analysis. 
Second, the presence of observers was massive: during the first round, OSCE/ODIHR 
election observers submitted 2,578 reports; during the second round, there were 
2,489 reports. During the repeated second round, observers submitted 5,920 report forms. 
This made it the largest mission in the OSCE/ODIHR history. For the 2004 presidential 
elections the national territory was divided into 225 Territorial Election Districts (TEDs), 
which administered the election locally through the formation of more than 33 thousands 
polling stations: 33,101 in the first round; 33,077 in the second; and 33,059 in the repeated 
second6). OSCE/ODIHR observers visited 2,203 polling stations during the first round, 1,998 
during the second, and 4,856 during the repeated second round7). 
The incumbents at the time of the 2004 presidential elections were President Leonid 
Kuchma and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. President Kuchma had already served 
two terms in office so he could no longer run. The incumbent candidate, supported by the 
President and by the Russian Federation was Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who 
stood as the candidate of the Party of Regions and promoted closer ties with Russia. 
Yanukovych ran against Viktor Yushchenko, leader of the Our Ukraine faction in 
the Ukrainian parliament and former Prime Minister, who stood as a “self-nominated” 
independent candidate. He called for Ukraine to turn its attention westward and 
eventually join the European Union. Before the elections, on 2 July 2004 Viktor 
Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko (of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc) formed the People’s 
Power, an electoral coalition to win the 2004 presidential elections. Viktor Yushchenko 
promised to nominate Yulia Tymoshenko as Prime Minister if he were to win the 
October 2004 presidential election. 
While 24 candidates contested the election, pre-election polls clearly indicated that only 
Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko enjoyed extensive popular support. Two other 
candidates led parties that passed the 4% representation threshold in the 2002 
parliamentary elections: Petro Symonenko (Communist Party) and Oleksandr Moroz 
(Socialist Party). The election was held in a tense atmosphere. Yanukovych and 
6)  Polling stations part of the 226th TED (i.e. polling stations outside Ukraine) are not included in this analysis. In fact, they did not have an equal chance of 
being visited (no observers were sent there); moreover, because very few votes were cast in these polling stations (0.22 percent of the total votes cast in 
the first round, 0,31 percent in the second round and 0.35 percent in the repeated second round), they are quite negligible. Furthermore, voter turnout 
was quite low: 23.7 in the first, 30.3 in the second and 29.6 percent, in the repeated second round (versus 74.5, 80.4 and 77.2 percent inside Ukraine). 
However, I did perform the analysis including these polling stations as well and the results did not change substantially. 
7)  The number of reports does not exactly match the number of polling stations visited by observers: in fact, observers can return to a polling station on 
the same election day if necessary. The OSCE/ODIHR Final Report provides more observed polling stations (pp. 25, 27, and 36) than the figures presented 
here. This is due to polling stations observed more than once by the same team of observers or by different teams during the same election day. The 
OSCE/ODIHR considers each as a single observation and counts them as such. For the purpose of this study, however, a polling station is either visited 
or not visited on the same election day, regardless of the number of visits. 
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Kuchma used their control of the government and state apparatus to intimidate 
Yushchenko and his supporters. Yushchenko was even poisoned with dioxin under 
mysterious circumstances in September 2004. However, he survived and continued with 
the election campaign, but the poisoning undermined his health and his disfigured face 
had altered his appearance dramatically.
The first round was held on 31 October 2004. The two main candidates achieved very 
similar results: Yanukovych got 39.27 percent of the votes and Yushchenko 39.91 percent. 
There were many complaints about voting irregularities in favour of Yanukovych. 
However, since neither Yanukovych nor Yushchenko was able to reach 50 percent of the 
votes, challenging the first-round results would not have prevented the run-off8). So the 
complaints were not actively pursued and both candidates concentrated on the upcoming 
second round, scheduled for 21 November 2004. 
The results of the second round saw Yanukovych winning the election with 49.47 percent 
of the votes, whereas Yushchenko fell short with the 46.61 percent. Protests began as soon 
as second-round election results were released, as the official count differed markedly 
from the exit poll results. These showed that Yushchenko was the winning candidate with 
an 11% advantage. While Yanukovych’s supporters justified this disparity by claiming that 
it was due to Yushchenko’s connections to the Ukrainian media, Yushchenko’s team 
presented a great deal of evidence of election fraud in favour of Yanukovych, witnessed by 
many local and foreign observers. 
Massive peaceful protests began on 22 November in a number of cities across Ukraine. 
This became known as “the Orange Revolution”. On 24 November 2004, the Central 
Election Commission (CEC), which was itself accused of tampering with the electoral 
results, officially declared Yanukovych the winner of the elections. This meant the end of 
negotiations between Yushchenko and the incumbent President Leonid Kuchma intended 
to peacefully resolve the situation. The day after, Yushchenko asked his supporters to 
begin a series of mass protests, general strikes and sit-ins with the aim to force Yanukovych 
to concede defeat. 
The political deadlock was finally broken, on 3 December 2004 by the Supreme Court, 
which decided that it was impossible to establish the results of the presidential elections 
with certainty because of the scale of the electoral fraud. Therefore it ordered a revote of 
the run-off election to be held on 26 December 2004. The 26 December re-vote attracted 
conspicuous international attention and was held under intense scrutiny of local and 
international observers. The preliminary results announced by the Central Election 
8)  According to the Ukrainian law, a run-off vote was to be held since no candidate obtained more than 50 percent of the ballots cast.
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Commission gave Yushchenko +5% and Yanukovych –5% in respect to the November 
election. Yanukovych attempted to legally complain before the Supreme Court of Ukraine 
and in the Central Election Commission, but all complaints were dismissed as without 
merit. The results of the run-off were officially made public on 10 January 2005 by the 
Central Election Commission. It declared Yushchenko the winner of the presidential election 
with 52 percent of the votes.
12.5 Testing the “Observer effect” 
through election results
In order to examine if the presence of international observers reduces election-day fraud 
and, if so, to what extent, we must perform a difference of means test (t-test). This test 
compares two groups of polling stations (observed vs. unobserved polling stations). Then 
it tests the hypothesis that the means of the two groups are the same. If observers have a 
measurable deterrent effect on election-day fraud, reducing fraud at the polling stations 
they visit, then, all else being equal, their presence should decrease the share of the votes 
for the fraud-sponsoring candidate or party, i.e. they should perform worse in polling 
stations that were visited.
If we had been facing an internationally observed two-round presidential election, we 
would have had to consider two rounds of treatment (polling stations observed) and a 
separate voting distribution for each round. We must bear in mind that observers, 
choosing polling stations near-randomly, can either visit a polling station only during the 
first round, only during the second round or during both rounds. This creates a fourfold 
sample of polling-station-level election results: one group of polling stations is never 
observed, another is observed only during the first round, another only during the second, 
and another during both rounds. 
Therefore, in cases of two-round elections, it is also possible to test if a first-round 
observation has had a lasting effect on the second round. The presence of international 
election observers, in fact, can have “immediate” or “lasting” effects. The first term suggests 
that observers are able to deter fraud, but only during the election they are observing (in 
this case, the first round). The second term suggests that the observers have a lasting 
effect on the actors’ behaviour in the second-round. To test if there are immediate effects 
we need to compare the share of the votes that the fraud-sponsoring candidate or party 
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got in the first round in unobserved and observed polling stations (not in the second 
round because there could be lasting effects at work). Instead, to test if the presence of 
observers in the first round generates lasting effects in the second round we must 
compare the second round vote share between the group of polling stations observed 
only in the first round and the group of never observed polling stations.
Our analysis is carried out on the vote share for the fraud-sponsoring candidate. In the 
case of the Ukrainian presidential election of 2004, this share is drawn from three different 
election results: first round (R1), second round (R2), and repeated second round (R3). 
Because of these three rounds, the natural experimental design entails a separate study 
of the vote share for each round. However, the “treatment” varies with each dependent 
variable (vote share): in fact, international observers went to different polling stations in 
different rounds but there was some overlap between rounds.
Specifically, the statistical population of the 2004 presidential election polling-station-
level results can be divided into a number of experimental groups, according to the round 
considered and to the “treatment” of international observation during the course of the 
Election Day:
1. considering the round-one vote share, the population can be divided into two 
experimental groups: one group of polling stations was observed (“observed in R1”), 
and one was not (“not observed in R1”);
2. considering the round-two vote share, the population can be divided into four 
experimental groups: one group of polling stations was observed only in the first 
round (“observed only in R1”), one was observed only in the second round (“observed 
only in R2”), one was observed in the first and in the second round (“observed in R1R2”), 
and one was never observed (“never observed”);
3. considering the repeated second round vote share, the population can be divided into 
eight experimental groups: one group of polling stations was observed only in the 
first round (“observed only in R1”), one was observed only in the second round 
(“observed only in R2”), one was observed only in the repeated second round (“observed 
only in R3”), one was observed in the first and in the second round (“observed in R1R2”), 
one was observed in the first and in the repeated second round (“observed in R1R3”), 
one was observed in the second and in the repeated second round (“observed in 
R2R3”), one group was observed in all three rounds (“observed in R1R2R3”) and one 
group was never observed (“never observed”)9)
9) Warning: depending on which vote share is used (R1, R2 or R3), the names of the comparison groups, while remaining the same, change in content. For 
example, “never observed” using R2 vote share means polling stations not observed in R1, not observed in R2, and not observed in R1R2, while “never 
observed” using R3 vote share means polling stations not observed in R1, not observed in R2, not observed in R1R2, not observed in R2R3, not observed 
in R1R3, and not observed in R1R2R3.
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Through a series of difference of means tests I investigated whether international 
observers reduce election-day fraud and if so to what extent. Actually, I performed 19 tests, 
each of them in 7 sub-groups (see below), for a total of 133 tests. However, to further 
corroborate results, each test was performed using both the vote share of the fraud 
sponsoring candidate, Yanukovych, and of the main opposition candidate, Yushchenko. 
So this resulted in a total of 266 tests. For reasons of space, I will not show all of them, but 
only the ones that are easiest to interpret. The remaining tests, although meaningful, 
significant and still corroborating the main hypothesis, will be left for future publication. 
12.6 All else being equal: what does it 
mean? 
The results of the analysis can be biased if we do not take a number of controls into 
account. Following Hyde (2007), I controlled for three variables. The first is a measure of 
the urban-rural divide. If a candidate (or a party) performs very well in urban areas and the 
sample of visited polling stations includes a disproportionate number of rural polling 
stations, then the candidate/party’s disproportionate support in urban areas will bias the 
results. To control for this source of bias, we can divide polling stations into urban vs. rural 
and perform the means test inside each group to see if the relation still holds10)
The second control is the size of the polling station. This is highly correlated to the 
difficulty of reaching it. The smaller the polling station is in terms of registered voters, the 
more difficult it is to reach for observers (and voters). If observers have systematic difficulty 
in getting to small polling stations, the mean difference between observed and unobserved 
polling stations can be the result of systematic dissimilarities between easy and hard to 
reach polling stations. The results of the tests would be biased if voters in small inaccessible 
polling stations systematically support a particular party or candidate. The effect of the 
observers’ presence must be robust as to the inclusion of measures of polling station 
size11)
10) Polling stations located in cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants (according to the 2001 Ukrainian census) are considered urban; all the others are 
considered non-urban.
11) Polling stations were divided in two groups: small polling stations where the number of registered voters was below the mean, and big polling stations 
where the number of registered voters was above the mean.
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The third control variable is in line with the first: the rationale is the same, but instead of 
the urban-rural divide it is assumed that a candidate may have a particularly strong 
electoral support in certain areas (maybe in his/her birth place, or among people of the 
same ethnicity, religion, etc.). Therefore, if a high proportion of unobserved polling stations 
is located in those areas, the results of the mean difference can be driven by this bias. This 
problem is solved through the same mechanic as the urban-rural divide. In the Ukrainian 
case, 77.8 percent of inhabitants are ethnic Ukrainians, but there is a sizable Russian 
minority (17.3%). Since Yanukovych’s campaign platform included the proposal of making 
Russian the second official language in Ukraine, in order to guarantee the support of the 
sizable Russian minorities in Eastern and Southern regions, he got great support in those 
regions. Therefore, polling stations were divided into two groups according to the 
presence of sizable Russian minorities: regions with more Russian native-speakers than 
the national mean (17.3%), according to the 2001 Ukrainian census12), and regions with up 
to 17.3% of Russian minority13).
The first round
During the first round, the two main candidates, Yanukovych and Yushchenko, gained 
39.42 percent and 39.71 percent of the national vote14)  respectively. While their national 
percentages were very similar, their voting distribution was geographically very different. 
Yushchenko had strong support in the North-West, while Yanukovych dominated in the 
South-East. The first round is the easiest to analyse. Actually, polling stations in round one 
can only be observed or not, making it impossible to check for lasting effects, therefore 
limiting the investigation to immediate effects. The first test performed, therefore, 
compares Yanukovych’s first round share of the votes15)  between observed and unobserved 
polling stations (observed vs. unobserved in R1) to check if observers have an immediate 
effect. If the presence of observers reduces election-day fraud, then the percentage of 
votes in favour of the cheating candidate should be significantly lower.
Difference of means tests that compared treatment and control groups were performed 
using round one vote share are shown in table 12.6.1 (test 1)16). However, before going to the 
analysis of the results, let me explain how these tables work because they will be the main 
12) People who declare Russian as their native-tongue, http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/
13) No other “ethnic” issue played a role in Ukrainian politics. Not even religious issues. The dominant religion is Eastern Orthodox Christianity among the 
Ukrainians and the Russian minorities.
14) The small differences with the data presented by the Ukrainian Central Election Commission are due to the exclusion, for the purpose of this analysis, 
of TED 226, the foreign election district.
15) For reasons of space, I will not show the results of tests using Yushchenko’s vote share. They mirror Yanukovych’s (what Yanukovych gained, Yushchenko 
lost) and therefore they represent a further confirmation of the fraud-reducing effect of observers, thus supporting our conclusions.
16) Data used in the tables are taken from the website of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine (http://www.cvk.gov.ua); data were downloaded at 
disaggregated level (polling station by polling station) and were then re-aggregated to construct graphs and tables.
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instruments used to present the results. They report the results of unpaired two-sample 
t-tests with unequal variance.  
Tests are numbered from 1 to 19 (I will show only some of them for reasons of space; other 
tests results are available upon request).  Column one (“Type of polling stations”) refers to 
the test type: the same test can be performed in 4 different ways: using all polling stations, 
controlling for polling station size, controlling for polling stations in regions with sizeable 
Russian minorities, and controlling for the urban/rural divide. Therefore, this column 
specifies to which groups of polling stations the test is applied: to all polling stations 
(“Total”), to polling stations with more registered voters than the mean (“Big”), to polling 
stations with fewer registered voters than the mean (“Small”), to polling stations in 
regions without significant Russian minorities (“Without Russians minorities”), to polling 
station in region with significant Russian minorities (“With Russians minorities”), to 
polling stations located in non-urban areas (“Non-urban”), or to polling stations located in 
urban areas (“Urban”). 
The next columns (“Average vote share among polling stations”) indicate which sub-
groups of polling stations will be compared by the t-test and the respective mean 
percentage vote shares for the candidate concerned. Column four present the mean 
difference between the percentages of the two sub-groups listed in the previous columns 
(in absolute terms) and, in parenthesis, the value of this mean difference compared to the 
candidate’s vote share in unobserved polling stations (thus, in relative terms)17); based on 
the value of the Student’s t-statistic, the level of significance is shown (column “Sign.”) and 
finally, in the last column, the number of observations is reported.  
Starting with table 12.6.1, we can see the effect of election observation on the share of the 
votes in the first round for Yanukovych, the fraud-sponsoring candidate. The first 
comparison involves the average share of the votes Yanukovych got in round one in 
unobserved polling stations versus the average share he got in observed polling stations. 
The results presented in table 1 clearly show that the presence of international observers 
reduced his share by an average of more than 4.6 percent (representing the 11.73% of 
Yanukovych’s share of the votes). This result is statistically significant at the 1% confidence 
level18), allowing a rejection of the (null) hypothesis that there is no difference between 
observed and unobserved polling stations. 
Let’s analyze these results in more detail. Test 1 compares vote shares in round one among 
17) Let’s explain the utility of this further computation with an example. Suppose that Yanukovych gets 20% of the votes in unobserved polling stations and 
10% in observed ones . The difference between the means is 10%. However, this 10% difference represents the 50% of Yanukovych’s vote share in 
unobserved polling stations [in fact: (10*100)/20=50]. Suppose that in another case, Yanukovych gets the 40% of the votes in unobserved polling 
stations and 30% in observed ones. The difference is still 10%, but, this time, it represents the 25% [(10*100)/40=25] of Yanukovych’s vote share in 
unobserved polling stations.
18)  The confidence level generally adopted in this research, as in most studies, is 5%.
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polling stations that were/were not observed in the first round. This test reveals the 
immediate effect of observation, that is, the effect of observation on the election results. 
So, by comparing the first round performance of the fraud-sponsoring candidate in the 
observed and unobserved polling stations, we can check if there is any statistically 
significant difference in performance. In this case there was a difference and it was quite 
strong (4.66% in absolute terms, 11.73% if compared to Yanukovych’s performance in 
unobserved polling stations). This is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level 
since Yanukovych did about 4.7 percent better in polling stations without international 
observers (increasing his vote share by 11.73%), suggesting that the presence of 
international observers in the first round reduced election-day fraud by more than 
4.6 percent all else being equal (and Yanukovych’s share of the votes by more than 11.7%).
12.6.1 Difference of means tests using Yanukovych’s vote share*
 




     
1 Yanukovych’s Lrst round vote share
Not observed in R1 Observed in R1
Total 39.74 35.08     4.66  (11.73) ** 33,101
Big 42.20 35.48     6.72  (15.92) ** 13,893
Small 34.04 30.68     3.35   (9.84) * 19,208
Without russian minorities 24.15 23.26     0.89   (3.68) 20,559
With russian minorities 58.50 49.09    12.41  (21.21) ** 12,542
Non-urban 35.20 30.82     4.38  (12.44) ** 17,424
Urban 43.13 37.08     6.06  (14.05) ** 15,677
2 Yanukovych’s second round vote share
Never observed Observed only in R2
Total 50.23 47.52     2.71   (5.39) ** 30,874
Big 54.26 47.75     6.50  (11.98) ** 12,224
Small 40.97 45.23    –4.26 (–10.40) 18,650
Without Russian minorities 29.77 32.37    –2.60  (–8.73) 19,425
With Russian minorities 73.09 60.64    12.44  (17.02) ** 11,449
Non-urban 43.72 42.11     1.61   (3.68) 16,625
Urban 55.09 49.75     5.34   (9.69) ** 14,249
3 Yanukovych’s second round vote share
Never observed Observed only in R1
Total 50.23 46.09     4.14   (8.24) 31,079
Big 54.26 47.01     7.26  (13.38) ** 12,351
Small 40.97 37.56     3.40   (8.30) * 18,728
Without Russian minorities 29.77 28.55     1.21   (4.06) 19,535
With Russian minorities 73.08 61.29    11.80  (16.15) ** 11,544
Non-urban 43.72 38.79     4.93  (11.28) ** 16,732
Urban 55.09 49.48     5.61   (0.18) ** 14,347
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12.6.1 Difference of means tests using Yanukovych’s vote share*
 




     
4 Yanukovych’s second round vote share
Total 50.23 41.20     9.03  (17.98) ** 29,842
Big 54.26 41.19    13.07  (24.09) ** 11,542
Small 40.97 41.59    –0.62  (–1.51) 18,318
Without Russian minorities 29.77 32.98    –3.21 (–10.78) 18,866
With Russian minorities 73.09 48.39    24.69  (33.78) ** 10,976
Non-urban 43.72 37.92     5.81  (13.29) 16,261
Urban 55.09 42.68    12.41  (22.53) ** 13,581
7 Yanukovych’s second round vote share
Never observed Observed only in R1, or only in R2, or only in R1R2
Total 50.23 45.93     4.30   (8.56) ** 33,077
Big 54.26 46.39     7.87  (14.50) ** 13,917
Small 40.97 41.15    –1.85  (–4.51) 19,160
Without Russian minorities 29.77 30.74    –0.97  (–3.26) 20,558
With Russian minorities 73.09 59.11    13.98  (19.13) ** 12,519
Non-urban 43.72 39.92     3.80   (8.69) * 17,424
Urban 55.09 42.68     6.51  (11.82) ** 15,653
9 Yanukovych’s second round vote share
Never observed Observed only in R3
Total 44.80 44.79     0.01   (0.02) 29,411
Big 51.09 45.89     5.19  (10.16) ** 11,124
Small 32.42 36.89    –4.46 (–13.76) ** 18,287
Without Russian minorities 23.07 24.00    –0.93  (–4.03) 18,671
With Russian minorities 72.88 61.09    11.79  (16.18) ** 10,740
Non-urban 36.31 38.02    –1.71  (–4.71) 16,122
Urban 51.82 47.82     4.00   (7.72) ** 13,289
10 Yanukovych’s repeated second round vote share
Never observed Observed only in R1, or only in R2, or in R1R2
Total 44.80 43.41     1.39   (3.10) 28,203
Big 51.90 44.85     6.24  (12.02) ** 10,403
Small 32.42 31.33     1.09   (3.36) 17,800
Without Russian minorities 23.07 24.82    –1.75  (–7.58) 17,237
With Russian minorities 72.88 62.62    10.24  (14.05) **  9,966
Non-urban 36.31 33.13     3.18   (8.76) * 15,614
Urban 51.82 48.14     3.67   (7.08) ** 12,589
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However, the observed difference can be driven by bias if the unobserved polling stations 
“naturally” supported the fraud-sponsoring candidate. If so, the result of the t-test is 
unreliable. Therefore in six subsequent tests, I controlled if this difference still holds in big 
and small polling stations, in polling stations located in regions with and without 
substantial Russian minorities, and in urban and non-urban settings. As table 12.6.1 shows, 
the hypothesized difference still holds in all of these sub-groups and the mean difference 
is statistically significant, apart from the polling stations located in regions without 
sizable Russian minorities. 
This can easily be explained: those were the regions in the North and in the West where 
the opposition candidate, Yushchenko, was really strong. In those regions voters and 
polling station officials did not support Yanukovych, reducing his possibility of 
manipulating the election results through election-day fraud. This is also confirmed by 
12.6.1 Difference of means tests using Yanukovych’s vote share*
 




     
14 Yanukovych’s repeated second
  round vote share
Never observed Observed in R1R2R3
Total 44.80 32.12    12.68  (28.30) ** 26,057
Big 51.09 31.78    19.30  (37.78) **  8,928
Small 32.42 43.37   –10.95 (–33.77) 17,129
Without Russian minorities 23.07 26.10    –3.02 (–13.09) 17,012
With Russian minorities 72.88 37.16    35.72  (49.01) **  9,045
Non-urban 36.31 26.96     9.34  (25.72) * 14,782
Urban 51.82 34.46    17.35  (33.48) ** 11,275
19 Yanukovych’s repeated second
  round vote share
Never observed
Observed only in R1, or only in R2, or only in R3, or in R1R2, or in R2R3, 
or in R1R3, or in R1R2R3
Total 44.80 43.01     1.79   (3.99) ** 33,059
Big 51.09 43.88     7.21  (14.11) ** 13,902
Small 32.42 35.37    –2.94  (–9.07) ** 19,157
Without Russian minorities 23.07 24.52    –1.45  (–6.28) * 20,555
With Russian minorities 72.88 58.48    14.40  (19.76) ** 12,504
Non-urban 36.31 35.67     0.64   (1.76) 17,423
Urban 51.82 46.26     5.56  (10.73) ** 15,636
 
Source: OSCE/ODIHR; Central Election Commission of Ukraine.
* 0,01 < p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01 (two-sided)
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the findings of OSCE/ODIHR observers, which claimed: “some 6% of observers assessed 
the voting process as bad (5%) or very bad (1%). There was a regional variation in the 
assessment. Polling was considered better in western regions (4% negative assessment) 
than in eastern regions (10% negative assessment)”19). The fraud-reduction power of 
observation in polling stations located in Yanukovych’s strongholds is impressive. The 
difference between unobserved and observed polling stations exceeds the remarkable 
threshold of 12.4 percent (21.21% if compared to Yanukovych’s vote share in unobserved 
polling stations) and it is significant at the 1 percent confidence level. 
We can see that the mean difference, while always statistically significant, is greater in 
big, urban polling stations than in small, non-urban ones. As mentioned before, the result 
can be biased if unobserved polling stations “naturally” supported the fraud-sponsoring 
candidate. But this is not the case. On the contrary, if we compare Yanukovych’s 
performance in unobserved small (34.04%) and big (42.20%) polling stations and in non-
urban (35.20%) and urban (43.13%) ones, we can easily see that Yanukovych performed 
better in big and urban polling stations where more polling stations were observed. This 
further supports our initial hypothesis and dismisses any possibility of bias in the results. 
Actually, if the difference is bigger in polling stations where the cheating candidate is 
stronger, this means that observers are more useful where the cheating candidate 
“naturally” gets more votes. In this regard, a further consideration can help. If the cheating 
candidate gets 34.04 percent in unobserved small polling stations, and his share is 
reduced by 3.35 percent, this means observation reduces his share of the vote by roughly 
10 percent. Yanukovych got the 42.20 percent in the big unobserved polling stations. The 
mean difference between observed and unobserved polling stations was 6.72 percent. 
This means a reduction of about 16 percent. The same is true for urban and non-urban 
polling stations. In the first case Yanukovych lost about 14 percent of his share, and about 
12.5 percent in the second. 
The second round
During the second round, Yanukovych got 49.75 percent of the national vote, while 
Yushchenko got 46.37 percent. As was the case in the first round, the distribution of votes 
was very different geographically. Yushchenko continued to have strong support in the 
North-West of the country, while Yanukovych dominated in the South-East. Again, the 
OSCE/ODIHR assessment of round two was straightforward: “Observers’ overall 
evaluation of the conduct of the poll was slightly worse than on 31 October, with 7% 
19)  OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, p. 25.
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assessing it as bad or very bad. However, there was a regional variation. Polling in western 
and northern regions was assessed negatively in 5% of reports and 11% and 9% respectively 
in central and eastern regions”. 
The second round allows us to test not only if there are immediate effects, but also if there 
are lasting effects of first round observations on the second round vote. Here, polling 
stations can belong to one of four groups: never observed, observed only in round one, 
observed only in round two, or observed in both rounds. This allows several tests: first, we 
can check for immediate effects. So we can compare the share of second-round votes 
between polling stations that were neither observed in round one nor in round two, and 
polling stations observed only in round two (test 2, never observed vs. observed only in R2). 
Second, we can test for the presence of lasting effects of round-one observation. So we 
can compare the share of second-round votes between polling stations that were never 
observed, and polling stations observed only in round one (test 3, never observed vs. 
observed only in R1). Third, we can measure the “total effect” of observation. So we can 
compare the share of second-round votes between unobserved polling stations and 
polling stations observed in both rounds (both the lasting effect of round one observation 
and the immediate effect of round two observation) (test 4, never observed vs. observed in 
R1R2). Fourth, we can check for a “general” effect of observation that does not distinguish 
between immediate and lasting effects. So we can compare the share of votes in 
unobserved polling stations with those in polling stations observed in one or both rounds 
(test 7, never observed vs. observed only in R1, only in R2, or in R1R2). 
Starting with test 2, we measure the immediate effect of round two observation. We 
compare the second round share of votes between polling stations observed in the second 
round (but not in the first), and those of unobserved polling stations. We expect the 
performance of the fraud-sponsoring candidate to be worse in observed polling stations. 
Without controlling for size, Russian minorities, or the urban/rural divide, we can confirm 
that there was an immediate effect of round two observation on round two Yanukovych’s 
share of the votes. Yanukovych’s performance, in fact, appreciably decreased by 2.71% 
(about 5.4% of his vote share in unobserved polling stations). If, however, we perform the 
same test controlling for polling stations size, Russian minorities, and the urban/rural 
divide, we become aware that the fraud-reduction effect is not significant in small, “non-
Russian”, and non-urban polling stations Even worse, performing the test across small and 
non-Russian polling stations gives results in the opposite direction. This could suggest a 
fraud-increasing effect of observation. However, those results are clearly not significant.
I already explained why the mean difference test is not significant in polling stations 
located in areas without considerable Russians minorities. The opposition candidate was 
strongly supported and fraud, if any, was less widespread. But why are results not 
significant in small and non-urban polling stations? Is this a real challenge for the overall 
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results? Remember why I decided to control for polling station size and the urban/rural 
divide. If most unobserved polling stations were small or non-urban and if Yanukovych 
“naturally” performed better in such polling stations, the result of the general mean 
difference test can be driven by this bias. 
However, looking at election results, this is not the case. Yanukovych was stronger in big 
rather than small polling stations (in unobserved polling stations: 54.26% > 40.97%), and 
in urban rather than in non-urban ones (55.09% > 43.72%). Therefore, the fact that those 
results are not significant does not refute the overall fraud-reducing effect of election 
observation. Maybe these results (not significant and sometimes in the opposite direction) 
are driven simply by the fact that in small, non-urban and non-Russian polling stations 
fraud was less widespread and therefore difficult to deter.
Test 3 establishes if the treatment of first-round observation has a lasting fraud-deterrent 
effect in the second round of the election. This is done by comparing the share of votes in 
round two between two groups that were not observed in the second round: one group 
was observed only in the first round, while the other group was not observed. If observation 
has a lasting deterrent effect on electoral fraud, then the cheating candidate should get a 
lower share of the vote in the second round in polling stations that were observed in the 
first round than in polling stations that were not observed. Here, all differences go in the 
expected direction for both candidates (positive for Yanukovych and negative for 
Yushchenko) and are statistically significant, apart from small polling stations and polling 
stations located in areas where the presence of Russian minorities is below the national 
mean. 
Results reported in test 3 show that the lasting effect of observation implies a reduction 
of Yanukovych’s share of the vote by 4.14 percent (that is indeed the 8.24% of Yanukovych 
second round share of the vote in unobserved polling stations). The effect is stronger in 
big and in Russian polling stations (where it remains significant) and in urban polling 
stations. Note the impressive difference in Russian polling stations: 11.8 percent. Again, 
results found in small polling stations and in regions without strong Russian minorities 
are not statistically significant, but they do not endanger the validity of the general result 
since the cheating candidate got a lower share of the vote there.
Test 4 provides additional empirical support for the finding that observers had a strong 
deterrent effect on election-day fraud. It compares the second-round vote share between 
unobserved polling stations and polling stations observed in round one and two. In fact, it 
measures the “total effect” of observation, i.e. the immediate effect of the round two 
observation added to the lasting effect of round one observation. In this case, Yanukovych 
received about 9 percent more votes in polling stations that were never observed than in 
the ones observed in both rounds (which is about 18% of his own vote share in unobserved 
polling stations). Those results are statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
Controlling for polling station size, Russian minorities, and the urban/rural divide, results 
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appear to be not significant in small, non-Russian and non-urban polling stations. The 
results even have the opposite sign in the first two sub-groups. This does not represent a 
problem as long as Yanukovych’s share of the vote is larger in big, Russian and urban 
polling stations.
Test 7 further supports the hypothesis that observers reduce election-day fraud. This is 
done by checking for a “general” effect of observation that does not distinguish between 
immediate and lasting effects. Using the round-two vote share, we can see if the cheating 
candidate received a higher vote share in polling stations that were not observed in either 
round, than in polling stations that were observed in one or both rounds. Since we 
hypothesize that observation always has some effect, we expect the cheating candidate’s 
share of the vote in round two to be lower, if observation has taken place in either or both 
rounds. Test 7 shows that Yanukovych received 4.3 percent more in polling stations that 
were not observed in either round than the average share he got in polling stations that 
were observed in one or both rounds. Test 7 shows that this effect is significant at the 1% 
confidence level. However, also this time, the relationship is reversed in small and non-
Russian polling station, although it is not significant. Again, this does not represent a 
problem for our results, but strengthens them. Please, note the really high fraud reduction 
effect of observation in polling stations located in Russian areas: about 14 percent.
The repeated second round
The repeated second round was held on 26 December, under the authority of a newly 
appointed Central Election Commission, which administered the election process 
efficiently and with significantly more transparency. Overall, observers assessed the 
process much more favourably than in the previous two rounds. OSCE/ODIHR observers 
noted the persistence of some problems, such as the presence of police and other 
unauthorized people, instances of failure to assure the secrecy of the vote (particularly in 
eastern regions), and the sporadic presence of campaign materials. 
According to the OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, polling procedures were generally respected: 
observers reported few serious violations; “however, in 3% of polling stations (5% in 
eastern regions and 6% in southern regions) they received allegations that serious 
violations had occurred. In the east and south of Ukraine the formal complaints filed at 
polling stations exceeded the national average”20). Almost 7 percent of observers assessed 
the vote count as poor or very bad (11% on November 21). However, again, “a clear regional 
20) OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, p. 36.
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variation was noted with observers in southern (11%), eastern (10%) and central (10%) 
regions assessing the process much less favourably than in northern (2%) and western 
(3%) regions. 
This was also the pattern in the observers’ assessment of the polling environment, 
organisation of the count, understanding of the procedures and the accuracy of the 
results as reported”21). A final point before going on with the analysis of the results: in the 
final week of the campaign, Yanukovych repeatedly called for amendments to the election 
law that restricted absentee voting and voting at home, which he deemed an infringement 
of voter rights. According to the data released by the CEC, some 590,000 voters (1.6% of 
registered voters) requested a mobile vote of whom about 90% voted. However, observers 
noted a few cases where an unusually large number of citizens had apparently requested 
to vote outside the polling station, and, curiously enough, this happened in TEDs 39, 136, 
143, 184, all located in the South and East. Overall, the largest concentrations of mobile 
voters were found in Donetsk and Luhansk, where it was reported that about 3% of 
registered voters requested to vote at home. It is impossible to demonstrate that it was an 
attempt to manipulate the vote, but it remains possible since it is easier to control the 
voters’ choice outside “regular” polling stations. From the perspective of this analysis, the 
improvements in election quality may result in a non-detectable fraud-deterrence role of 
election observation simply because there was no, or very little fraud going on. This should 
not be true in Southern and Eastern regions (i.e. in regions with sizable Russian minorities), 
where fraud persisted. Let’s see.
Starting with test 9, I compared the repeated second round vote share between polling 
stations never observed and polling stations observed only during the repeated second 
round. This measures the presence of an immediate effect of observation in a context in 
which election-day fraud was greatly reduced. From the results of test 9 we can hypothesize 
that, since the level of election irregularities dramatically decreased, the presence of 
observers did not in general have a deterrent effect: Yanukovych, in fact, generally had very 
similar results in observed and unobserved polling stations and the small difference is not 
at all statistically significant. However, the difference remained quite big and statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level in Yanukovych strongholds (where there was still 
fraud): in big, Russian, and urban polling stations. In the other cases the difference goes in 
the opposite direction and/or does not reach statistical significance.
In order to test for the presence of lasting effects of previous rounds, we can compare 
never observed polling stations with polling stations observed during round one, round 
two, or both (test 10). If there are lasting effects, then Yanukovych’s repeated second 
round vote share should be lower in observed polling stations. Apart from polling stations 
21)  OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, pp. 36–37.
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located in the North and in the West where the relationship is not significant in any case, 
the results go in the expected direction (see test 10). They are not significant in small and 
non-Russian polling stations, and since more polling stations used in this mean difference 
test are in those groups, this may explain why the general test turns out to be not 
significant. However, note the still high (lasting) fraud-reducing effect of observation in 
polling stations located in Yanukovych’s stronghold, i.e. in the South and in the East of the 
Ukraine (more than 10.2%, that, if compared to his vote share in unobserved polling 
stations, represents more than 14%).
Test 14 compares Yanukovych’s repeated second round vote share in polling stations never 
observed with the same vote share in polling stations observed during first, second and repeated 
second round; we are, therefore, testing the magnitude of the lasting effects of round one and 
round two observation together with the immediate effect of the repeated second round 
observation: we will see what the effect is of observing the same polling stations three times. 
Test 14 shows that there is a difference and that it is quite strong. Notwithstanding the 
lower level of fraud, the deterrent effect of observation played a role. Yanukovych’s vote 
share was reduced by about 12.7 percent (28.3% of his vote share in unobserved polling 
stations). This difference is significant at the 1% confidence level and it is even stronger in 
big, Russian, and urban polling stations, while it remains negative and not significant in 
small and non-Russian polling stations.
A final test, test 19, compares the repeated second round vote share between polling 
stations that were never observed and polling station that were observed in any round or in 
any combination of rounds, showing if the presence of observers in at least one occasion 
has a deterrent effect. According to the results shown in table 9, there is generally a positive 
deterrent effect of observation: Yanukovych gained about 1.8 percent less in observed 
polling stations. Those findings are even stronger and significant in big, Russian and urban 
polling stations. This adds one additional piece of information supporting the hypothesis 
that observers reduce election-day fraud through immediate and/or lasting effects.
12.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, I proposed an experimental research, in the wake of Susan Hyde’s work 
(2007), which allowed us to check if election observers contribute to fraud-deterrence. 
This work adds an additional argument supporting international observation missions, 
their role in deterring election-day fraud (and not only in detecting it), and, consequently, 
the importance of their presence for a free and fair election process which is able to lead 
234 Statistics Netherlands
to stronger democratization. We have repeatedly claimed that the fundamental 
quantifiable effect of election observation on election-day fraud should be a decrease of 
the share of the votes for the fraud-sponsoring candidate. We have seen that observers 
were able to reduce fraud at the polling stations they visited, since Yanukovych performed 
significantly worse (and Yushchenko significantly better) in the observed polling stations. 
The results of the tests performed above show that:
1. International observation had an immediate effect in the first and in the second round. The 
same is not true for the repeated second round because the level of election irregularities 
dramatically decreased. However, there was an immediate effect of observation, and quite 
strong where fraud was still present: in the South and in the East of the country. 
2. Observation in the first round had lasting effects on the second round. But observation 
in the first and/or the second round did not have lasting effects in the repeated second 
round if all polling stations are considered, but there was an effect, and it remained 
significant, if only the polling stations located in Yanukovych’s strongholds are taken 
into consideration.
3. Observing the same polling stations in all two or three rounds gives positive results, 
confirming the hypothesis that international election observers did reduce fraud. 
4. Observation always played a role where fraud was widespread, that is, in regions with 
sizable Russian minorities.
It is plausible that this happened because the simple presence of international observers 
inhibited the fraudulent behaviour of election stake-holders. 
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